Lebanon is stuck between a rock and a hard place. Hezbollah hasn’t declared its readiness to disarm. Israel hasn’t declared its readiness to withdraw. The latter is basing its potential withdrawal on Hezbollah conclusively and voluntarily liquidating its military apparatus. The former is basing its disarmament on a conclusive end to Israeli violations. Two influential narratives are currently moving this discussion: One based in Washington and a number of Lebanese circles pushing for further Israeli war to decisively end Hezbollah’s military capacity. Another based in Lebanon sympathizing with Hezbollah’s case and arguing for appeasement and “buying time” in the face of the stark challenges.
While there are alternatives to both narratives in either setting, the loudest of voices have pushed for polarizing and hawkish sentiments. As opposed to this divisive climate, what’s needed is bold and transformative mobilization in the domestic and international scene, centering the interests and story of Lebanese around a forward-looking national vision. This requires a creative and public defense of Lebanese sovereignty on the international stage, alongside a bold political confrontation with Hezbollah’s factional opportunism and shortsighted investment in sectarian power politics.
Lebanon’s Political Class is Opting for Safety
President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam are leading a transitional phase in the country’s history – they are presiding over a “reality on the ground” enforced primarily by Hezbollah’s military defeat in the last war, with atrocious and tragic implications on civilians in South Lebanon, the Bekaa, and the southern suburbs of Beirut. Following the violent episode, Salam and Aoun openly responded to this new reality on their own terms, initially signaling the need to push for Hezbollah’s disarmament, banking reform, and wider systemic changes to Lebanon’s governance formula and social contract.
However, as opposed to the public adamance of Nawaf Salam on matters of security and disarmament, Aoun has attempted a reconciliatory approach with Hezbollah, despite the group’s Secretary General Naim Kassem refusing to compromise. While Aoun has repeatedly stressed that Hezbollah’s weapons are a “thing of the past”, Kassem has been unambiguously clear that the group will not give up its weapons. Speaker of Parliament and Hezbollah ally Nabih Berri has also hinted that the party has the right to rebuild following its overwhelming losses.
Amid these repressed ambiguities on tackling how to deal with this dilemma, the Pope’s latest visit to Lebanon is a strong demonstration of the establishment’s behavior. Coexistence is merely a performance in the face of a frustrated international community; it is the exception occasionally performed despite the general rule of unresolved sectarian in-fighting and the lack of political will. Instead of conclusively settling this divisive file fracturing the Lebanese political landscape, the ruling class has opted for a constant oscillation between “strife” and “accommodation”, masking the serious holes in Lebanon’s fabric and postponing an exponentially-growing societal explosion.
Most recently, Berri subtly approved the addition of a Lebanese civilian (Former Ambassador Simon Karam) to the so-called “mechanism” committee made up of Israeli, American, and Lebanese officials – it is mostly concerned with the implementation of the ceasefire. This comes in opposition to the usual arrangement of restricting negotiations to a logistical-military level. Kassem then responded with a rejection of the move, leaving much of the public opinion confused about the practical roadmap of restoring stability back to South Lebanon and facilitating the return of the displaced population.
Hezbollah, ideologically and organizationally tied to its armed wing, is unable to convincingly communicate its political transition to its constituency amid the pressures from Israel and the US. It has also become conceivable at this stage that the Lebanese state could conclude a security agreement with Israel while allowing Hezbollah to retain part of its arsenal away from the southern border. In such a scenario, the party would no longer pose a security threat to Israel, all while preserving its disproportionate influence over Lebanon’s internal politics.
Israeli War as a Catalyst for Militancy
Hezbollah’s transnational mission is finished, particularly with the fall of the Assad regime and the party’s patron, Iran, facing existential economic and political pressures. Israel’s successful destruction of Hezbollah’s leadership via vast military action has accelerated this trajectory. It continues to undermine the party’s vast social base in Lebanon, alongside the formidable and deep social and economic relations it has developed over the past 30 to 40 years.
However, while Israel damaged Hezbollah as a regional actor and hindered its economic capacity, it amplified the legitimacy of its perpetual victimhood. Following the mass destruction unleashed by the war of September 2024, a sense of resentment has been galvanized among residents of South Lebanon, the overall Shi’a population, and a large portion of Lebanese across multiple sects. To this day, more than half of Lebanon’s Shi’a population still supports Hezbollah maintaining its arms. It has also raised legitimate concerns about Israel’s militaristic motivations and incentives, further demonstrated by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s need for perpetual war to avoid judicial accountability in the absence of any clear project for peace. Hezbollah has leveraged these concerns in the direction of legitimizing what’s left of its arms and sub-state military capacity – the party is ready to justify any current or subsequent military build-up.
While this doesn’t bring back Hezbollah’s lost military capacity, it does provide it with a strong, cost-free electoral campaign pending the 2026 parliamentary elections. Banking on popular frustrations, historical conceptions of resistance, and a weak state, Hezbollah has been able to advance an emotional narrative centering its defiance against Israel’s campaign of mass erasure. For many, the current confrontation appears one-sided, which is certainly true if we observe the daily Israeli ceasefire breaches, now exceeding 10,000 air and ground violations (according to UNIFIL). In characterizing the Lebanese government’s appointment of a civilian negotiator to the “mechanism” committee, Kassem affirmed that the government gave Israel a “free concession”.
From Hezbollah’s perspective, it is engaged in an existential battle in the pursuit of mobilizing and re-affirming its power in all political, economic, and social contexts. The party doesn’t need to respond militarily; it estimates that it can wait until a more favorable moment arises. In the long-term, Israel’s violence of erasure will not deter militancy. It’ll serve as the ideological imagery used to justify and promote the social prominence and electoral prowess of Hezbollah’s economic and political institutions.
It’s Time to Think Big: Is a “Third Story” Possible?
Hezbollah’s disarmament is no easy task. The proposal by some internal and external actors to push the Lebanese Army, an under-equipped and under-funded institution, to disarm the party by force, is unrealistic. It also has catastrophic consequences on an already fragile and divided society with minimal, if any, chances of success. Naturally, if the use of force is out of the question, the creation of a new political and economic system that would reorganize Lebanon’s social contract into an inclusive system is in order.
Many commentators and policy-makers have proposed multiple paths forward, but in our view, they remain limited and largely confined to the logic of sectarian compromise that has crippled the country for decades. One increasingly popular proposition is granting Shi’as larger representation in state institutions, particularly in the executive. While it is true that this sect is underrepresented, these proposals are largely theoretical and as far as we can tell aren’t seriously discussed by those in power. They aren’t considered a serious option by Hezbollah itself, which had enjoyed its own parallel state-like institutions in much of the country for decades.
In reality, despite advances by President Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam in reasserting the State’s central role in decision making, material and local power is still in the hands of a handful of sectarian leaders with their own interests and considerations that do not necessarily align with the government’s intentions. It is doubtful that those same leaders who have plundered state institutions for decades and derive their legitimacy from sectarian fearmongering would be willing to hand over some of their power to a “third way” authority to achieve such an outcome. Instead, some publicly or privately prefer a “final round” of war that would see a massive Israeli bombing campaign against Hezbollah and its immediate “environment”, thus making any conceivable political transition less costly for Hezbollah’s opponents.
Instead of advancing a posture of “buying time”, Salam and Aoun need to proceed with a bold, decisive vision that sets them apart from traditional political factions and programs – they need to “risk it all”. This entails a contentious domestic political program which puts them at odds with Hezbollah, the banking lobby, the generators mafia, those standing in the face of universal health care, and any local and international obstructions towards a comprehensive reconstruction package. Instead of scoring a deal with powerful former warlords and global institutions, Salam and Aoun need to connect with various cross-sectarian constituencies from below – addressing their causes, anxieties, and immediate local needs.
In terms of foreign policy, they need to pursue a “new populism” centering the patriotic disposition of most in the country frustrated with Israel’s overreach; this entails creatively advancing Lebanon’s international standing via media and global institutions, in both Arabic and English. In other words, Lebanon needs to situate itself in the global movement for justice against war, instead of submitting to the country’s marginal irrelevance when contrasted with the dramatic events taking place in the US Ukraine, Palestine, Syria, or Venezuela.
Causes aren’t solely highlighted because of the toll of atrocities – they are first and foremost driven by the hard work of those putting it on the world hostage, rejecting the silence enforced by the priorities of those more powerful and capable. To break barriers and ceilings, Lebanon’s government needs to think big and act fast, to gain both the necessary credibility and attention needed to save the country before either Israel or militaristic sectarian forces gain more leverage at the expense of the country’s unity and strategic interests.
